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COMMENTS
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND THE CONGRESS:
PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The doctrine of executive privilege has surfaced at the height of several
controversies recently and this exposure has raised numerous questions
concerning its nature, none of which have been more debated than the
validity of its existence.' Its advocates have pointed to history, statutes,
court decisions, and the Constitution in an effort to justify its use, while
its skeptics using the same materials have arrived at a different conclu-
sion. The ultimate resolution of this issue is of more than academic con-
cern, for executive privilege has created an executive-legislative schism
the breadth of which threatens the constititional framework of this na-
tion's government. 2 Is executive privilege well-established doctrine or ill-
supported dogma? What are the effects of its assertion? And most im-
portantly, is constitutional government in the United States institutionally
equipped to resolve fundamental differences between its co-equal
branches? These are the questions which are raised by the privilege and
which will be considered during the course of this analysis. However,
before proceeding further, executive privilege must be defined. Its sup-
porters contend that it is an unlimited right of the executive branch to
withhold information requested by the legislature pursuant to its authority
to investigate. Thus, the analysis will begin with a survey of the con-
gressional power of investigation.
1. For more information about executive privilege and related problems see
Berger, Executive's Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1043
(1965); Bishop, The Executive Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parlia-
mentary Investigation: A Comparative Study, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1943) and
11 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1944); Kramer and Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study
of the Period 1953-1960 (pt. 1), 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1961) and (pt. 2)
29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 827 (1961); Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and
Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as an Autonomous Screen, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
199 (1958); Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47
CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1959); Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Se-
crecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 755 (1959).
2. The problems caused by executive privilege have grown in intensity due to
the fact that its use has increased. President Kennedy claimed it four times during
his abbreviated term whereas President Nixon has invoked its shield nineteen times
during his presidency. 31 CONG. Q. WK. REP. No. 38, at 729, Mar. 31, 1973.
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CONGRESS' POWER OF INVESTIGATION
It is essential that Congress possess broad investigatory powers. To
deny this authority would be to compel all of the legislative processes-
that is, proposal, debate, decision, and assessment-to be performed in
an injudicious fashion, the end product of which would be ineffective con-
gressional enactments. Not only does Congress need information to per-
form its legislative tasks, but once a particular law has been passed it
also needs to convey to the people all of the pertinent data concerning
that legislation in order to generate the public support and voluntary com-
pliance so necessary for the success of any legislative program.3  Thus,
if Congress is to adequately meet its constitutional responsibilities to the
people it needs facts---all of the facts.
In McGrain v. Daugherty,4 the Supreme Court determined that there
were two bases to support the existence of an investigatory power. The
first source is found by constitutional resort to the necessary and proper
clause.5 However, principal reliance is placed on the power to legislate, 6
a power which is felt to include attributive authority to investigate in fur-
therance of that end. 7 As the Court was later to state: "Investigations,
whether by standing or special committees, are an established part of rep-
resentative government."8 Despite this type of blanket endorsement, con-
gressional investigations are not without limitations.
In Wilkinson v. United States,9 the Supreme Court was confronted with
a challenge to a contempt citation issued by the House Un-American Ac-
3. See p. 697 and accompanying notes infra. In addition, Woodrow Wilson
has proferred another use for the Congressional informing function:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every
affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant
to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its
constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the
government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served;
and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sight them by every
form of discussion, the country remain in embarrassing, crippling ignor-
ance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should under-
stand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function.
W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885).
4. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See 273 U.S. at 175.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. 273 U.S. at 174-75.
8. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). Accord, Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
196 (1880).
9. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
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tivities Committee which was investigating Communist infiltration into the
textile industry. During the course of the proceedings the witness, Wilk-
inson, refused to answer the question, "Are you now a member of the
Communist Party,"'10 on the grounds that the Committee was without law-
ful authority to interogate him and that its questioning violated his first
amendment rights. In rejecting these contentions and affirming the con-
viction, the Court delineated the boundaries within which Congress must
confine its investigations."
First, there must be a subject matter for the inquiry. Second, the in-
vestigation must be authorized by Congress.' 2  Third, the legislature must
have a valid legislative purpose which it is pursuing. This requirement
is especially broad, since there is an initial presumption that all congres-
sional investigations are conducted with the requisite legitimate intent,"13
and since congressional examinations are not limited to the scope or con-
tent of contemplated legislation.' 4 As the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals explained:
In deciding whether the purpose is within the legislative function, the
mere assertion of a need to consider "remedial legislation" may not alone
justify an investigation ...but when the purpose asserted is supported by
reference to specific problems which in the past have been or which in
the future could be the subjects of appropriate legislation, then we cannot
say that a committee of Congress exceeds its broad power when it seeks in-
formation in such areas.15
Fourth, the witness must be contemporaneously informed of his rights
and then, in the subsequent proceeding, none of those rights must be
violated.'6 In Watkins v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court, in holding
the Bill of Rights applicable to congressional inquiries, posited the method
by which to discern if an individual's constitutional guarantees had been
10. Id. at 404.
11. Id. at 408-409.
12, See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); United
States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956).
13, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 (1959); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 178
(1927).
14. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
15. Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969). Accord, Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599
(1962); Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Tobin,
195 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. 1961). But see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
46 (1953).
16. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155 (1955).
17. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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abridged. "The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to
be ascribed to, the interest of Congress in demanding disclosures from
an unwilling witness.""' This balancing-of-interests approach was applied
in Barenblatt v. United States,'9 a case in which the petitioner asserted
-the first amendment's freedom of association mandate as a bar to ques-
tions concerning his relationship with the Communist Party asked by the
House Un-American Activities Committee. The Court rejected this con-
tention based on its feeling that the Government's interest in dealing with
Communist activity, which it described as the right of self-preservation,
far outweighed that of the individual in secreting his personal affilia-
tions.20 It is to be noted, however, that the petitioner's argument was
based on the first amendment and not on the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination which, had it been asserted, would have success-
fully circumvented the interrogation. 21
The fifth and final limitation-whether the question is pertinent to the
investigation-dovetails with the fourth requirement, for it directly fo-
cuses on the individual's right to expose and repel irrelevant inquiry.
Once the subject matter of the investigation has been ascertained, the
questions must be related to and in furtherance of that subject matter.
Two issues are raised when disclosure is refused by a witness on perti-
nency grounds. First, the due process clause of the fifth amendment re-
quires that a criminal law clearly appraise those subject to its sanctions
of possible violations. 22 Since the appropriate remedial action for a con-
gressional committee to take against a contumacious witness is contempt
which carries criminal penalties, 28 it is incumbent upon the committee
at the time of the refusal to relate to the uncooperative witness the rele-
vancy of the request in view of the subjejct matter of the inquiry, or a
contempt proceeding will fail on the basis of vagueness. The necessary
connection between the subject matter of the investigation and the parti-
cular request may be indicated by Congress through the resolution au-
thorizing the investigation, the opening remarks of the committee chair-
man or members, the nature of the investigative proceedings thus far con-
ducted, or even the questions themselves.24 However, if the witness, af-
ter receiving this explanation, still refuses to cooperate and if the commit-
18. Id. at 198.
19. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
20. Id. at 134.
21. See pp. 698-99 and accompanying notes infra.
22. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 170, 208-09 (1957).
23. See note 32 and accompanying text.
24. 354 U.S. at 208-14.
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tee then decides to initiate contempt proceedings, the second issue regard-
ing the pertinency requirement is raised, for in a contempt proceeding
Congress has the burden of proving the pertinency of its request.
The relationship between these two pertinency issues was explained by
the Supreme Court in Deutch v. United States,25 in which a witness, asked
certain questions by the House Un-American Activities Committee, re-
fused to respond on the ground that his answer would violate a moral
conviction he held against testifying against his friends. The Court, in
dismissing the contempt conviction against Deutch, found that while his
objection to the questions was not based on a pertinency claim and there-
by did not necessitate a committee explanation of the connection between
the subject matter and the request, nonetheless the government did not
meet the pertinency burden at trial. Thus, in the first instance the perti-
nency of the request need only be explained by a congressional investiga-
tive committee if the witness raises the issue as an objection during the
congressional inquiry. However, in the second phase of a contempt con-
viction, the trial, the pertinency requirement will always be encountered
by the government since it is a statutory element of proof.26
Another issue which frequently arises in the litigation of the pertinency
requirement has been the exposure problem: the question cannot at-
tempt to expose the private affairs of the witness merely for the sake
of exposure. 27 This claim was raised in Hutcheson v. United States28
in which the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor
or Management Field, investigating the possibility of drafting legislation
to stop the misuse of union funds by union officials, interrogated Hutche-
son, a union president, about the use of union funds under his control.
He refused to answer eighteen questions on this subject. He alleged as
grounds for his uncooperative responses that the Committee's purpose in
examining him was to subject his union activities to prosecutorial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court rejected this argtmnent by pointing out that a validly
authorized congressional investigation, which has as its focus an area in
25. 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
26. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). It should be noted that the issue of pertinency when
raised at trial is a question of law to be determined by the judge. Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). For other examples of the judicial disposition of the
pertinency requirement, see, e.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S.
576 (1958); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Silber v. United
States, 296 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 717
(1962); and Presser v. United States, 284 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
27. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
28. 369 U.S. 599 (1962). See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263
(1929).
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which it could legitimately legislate, need not avoid questions which, al-
though otherwise relevant to the inquiry, may potentially be harmful to
a witness in a law suit.29 Again though, questions 'which may produce
incriminating answers may be averted by an assertion of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. 0
As this survey indicates, congressional exploratory power is as broad
as the power to legislate and, as a cursory glance at the legislative his-
tory of the United States discloses, the power to legislate is all-pervasive.
It has to be comprehensive. Congressional enactments, unlike judicial
decisions, immediately affect the rights and expectations of millions of
people-they are just too important to be established without an exhaus-
tive examination of all of the pertinent facts. However, Congress' au-
thority to investigate means little if in addition Congress possesses no con-
comitant power to compel the cooperation of contumacious witnesses. As
the Supreme Court stated in McGrain v. Daugherty:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information. . . recourse must be had to others who do pos-
sess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information
often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential
to obtain what is needed.8 '
Therefore, in order to assert this power two statutes were enacted. The
first statute, referred to earlier in the discussion of the pertinency require-
ment, enables Congress to punish for contempt any person properly sum-
moned either to testify to or to produce records for a congressional com-
29. 369 U.S. at 618.
30. See pp. 698-99 and accompanying notes infra.
31. 273 U.S. at 175. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186 (1946), wherein the Court stated:
We think, therefore, that the courts of appeals were correct in the view
that Congress has authorized the Administrator rather than the district
courts in the first instance, to determine the question of coverage in the
preliminary investigation of possibly existing violations; in doing so to ex-
ercise his subpoena power for securing evidence upon which that question,
by seeking the production of petitioners relevant books, records and papers;
and in case of refusal to obey his subpoena, issued according to the statutes
authorization, to have the aid of the district court in enforcing it. No
constitutional provision forbids Congress to do this. On the contrary, its
authority would seem clearly to be comprehended in the "necessary and
proper" clause, as incidental to both its general legislative and its investi-
gative powers.
Id. at 214.
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mittee 3 2 The second statute33 disallows any claim of privilege based on
the contention that the testimony or the production of records may dis-
grace the witness.3 4 Despite the existence of these statutes and the judicial
limitation placed on the utilization of the Bill of Rights by a recalcitrant
witness to avoid congressional examination, the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination does, for all practical purposes, allow the
witness to invoke its protection without a great possibility of successful
challenge.8 5
First, the privilege applies to answers that have a tendency to incrim-
inate.36 For example, in United States v. Lacavoli,3 7 an individual sus-
pected of illegal activities successfully claimed the privilege when a Senate
committee investigating organized crime asked him the nature of his busi-
32. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970) reads:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority
of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon
any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Con-
gress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer
any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000
nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than
one month nor more than twelve months.
33. 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1970) reads:
No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any
paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either House of Congress,
or by any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution
of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon
the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper
may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.
Both this statute and 2 U.S.C. § 192 were found to be constitutional in In Re Chap-
man, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
34. See pp. 695-97 and accompanying notes supra for a discussion of the exposure
problem.
35. As was seen in the discussion of the Barenblatt case, supra note 19 and
accompanying text, the assertion of individual liberties by a witness to avoid con-
gressional inquiry prompts the application of the balancing of interests test to deter-
mine whether the witness may justifiably decline to answer. However, the Court
in Barenblatt also indicated that the protection of the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination if properly raised does, unlike reliance on the other con-
stitutionally protected freedoms, afford the witness absolute protection. The Court
stated: "[T]he protections of the First Amendment unlike a proper claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not afford a wit-
ness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances." Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
36. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
37. 102 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ohio 1952). See also Jackins v. United States,
231 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1952); Marcello v. United States,
196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
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ness interests. Moreover, the fifth amendment is also an appropriate
shield for questions that may produce answers which, although not incrim-
inating in themselves, may, nonetheless, provide a link in the chain of
evidence needed for the prosecution of that witness.3 8  This is illustrated
by the case of United States v. Auippa39 in which a Senate commitee
investigating organized crime asked the witness whether he owned a lodge
in another state. The purpose of this inquiry was to solicit from the
witness the names of others who were suspected of hiding at his lodge
in order to avoid service of process. His reliance on the right against
self-incrimination as grounds for a refusal to answer the question was up-
held by a federal district court since the answer might have furnished
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him.40  Assuming
that the legislature has adhered to the limitations on its investigatory
power and that the witness has unsuccessfully claimed or has not raised
a constitutional shield to avoid the production of documents or the re-
sponse to questions, Congress may, in order to preserve and carry out
its legislative authority, 41 punish the recalcitrant witness of contempt in
accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 192.42
Investigative Power and The Executive
The primary problem faced by the national legislature when it attempts
to assert its investigatory authority over the executive is one of power-
the power to compel disclosure from a co-equal branch of the Govern-
ment. The Supreme Court has held that the congressional subpoena
power vests the legislature with the same scope of authority as is possessed
by the courts in their use of judicial subpoenas.43  The only difference
38. 341 U.S. at 486.
39. 102 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd on other grounds, 201 F.2d 287 (6th
Cir. 1952).
40. 102 F. Supp. at 614.
41. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917).
42. See discussion at note 32 supra.
43. In Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the Supreme Court stated
that Congress has "the right to compel the attendance of witnesses, and their an-
swers to proper questions, in the same manner and by the use of the same means
that courts of justice can in like cases." Id. at 190. In addition, the Court has
likened the congressional investigative power to that of the grand jury, United States
v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 510 (1943), and in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), the Court, in commenting upon the function of the grand jury, cited approv-
ingly the view of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that a grand jury investiga-
tion "is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined ...... United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.
1970), as cited in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 701.
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is the purpose for which the information is gathered; the courts use the
information to settle disputes while Congress considers the data in formu-
lating national policy. 44 Since the congressional inquiry into the Water-
gate scandal marks the first historic attempt by Congress to force an un-
cooperative President to relinguish information, 45 the use of judicial sub-
poenas in analogous situations must furnish the guidance.
44. Although both the judicial and the legislative use of subpoenas serves vital
interests, the legislative need is the more essential of the two, since initially more
interests are involved in a legislative determination than are involved in a court
decision. See p. 697 supra.
45. When past Presidents refused to comply with congressional requests for in-
formation, Congress acquiesced in these refusals by not pursuing the particular re-
quests further. It is these self-serving refusals which the advocates of an executive
prerogative have cited as precedential evidence favoring the existence of the privi-
lege. Despite the Supreme Court's view that constitutional interpretation may be
established by prior usage, the use of unchallenged, past presidential practice as sup-
port for executive privilege reveals the nature of its claim to validity; it is untested,
unresolved political theory. However, for the purpose of historical reference some
of the instances in which Presidents refused to comply with congressional demands
for information are:
PRESIDENT
George Washington
Thomas Jefferson
James Monroe
Andrew Jackson
John Tyler
James K. Polk
Millard Fillmore
James Buchanan
DATE TYPE OF INFORMATION REFusED
1796 Instruction to U. S. Minister concerning Jay
Treaty.
1807 Confidential information and letters relating to
Burr's conspiracy.
1825 Documents relating to conduct of naval officer.
1833 Copy of paper read by President to heads of
departments relating to removal of bank de-
posits.
1835 Copies of charges against removed public of-
ficial.
List of all appointments made without Senate's
consent between 1829 and 1836, and those re-
ceiving salaries, without holding office.
1842 Names of Members of 26th and 27th Congress*
who had applied for office.
1843 Colonel Hitchcock's report to War Department
dealing with alleged frauds practiced on In-
dians, and his views of personal characters of
Indian delegates.
1846 Evidence of payments made through State De-
partment on President's certificates, by prior
administration.
1852 Official information concerning proposition
made by King of Sandwich Islands to transfer
islands to U. S.
1860 Message of Protest to House against Resolu-
tion to investigate attempts by Executive to
influence legislation.
[Vol. 23700
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In United States v. Burr,46
the possession of the President
the Supreme Court held that a letter in
and relevant to the defense of the accused
Abraham Lincoln
Ulysses S. Grant
Rutherford B. Hayes
Grover Cleveland
Theodore Roosevelt
Calvin Coolidge
Herbert Hoover
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President Truman
1861 Dispatches of Major Anderson to the War
Department concerning defense of Fort Sumter.
1876 Information concerning executive acts per-
formed away from Capitol.
1877 Secretary of Treasury refused to answer ques-
tions and to produce papers concerning reasons
for nomination of Theodore Roosevelt as Col-
lector of Port of New York.
1886 Documents relating to suspension and removal
of 650 Federal officials.
1909 Attorney General's reasons for failure to prose-
cute U. S. Steel Corporation.
Documents of Bureau of Corporations, De-
partment of Commerce.
1924 List of companies in which Secretary of Treas-
ury Mellon was interested.
1930 Telegrams and letters leading up to London
Naval Treaty.
1932 Testimony and documents concerning investi-
gation made by Treasury Department.
1941 Federal Bureau of Investigation reports.
1943 Director, Bureau of the Budget, refused to
testify and to produce files.
Chairman, Federal Communications Commis-
sion, and Board of War Communications re-
fused records.
General Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, refused to produce records.
Secretaries of War and Navy refused to furnish
documents, and permission for Army and Naval
officers to testify.
1944 J. Edgar Hoover refused to give testimony and
to produce President's directive.
1945 Issued directions to heads of executive depart-
ments to permit officers and employees to
give information to Pearl Harbor Committee.
President's directive did not include any files
or written material.
1947 Civil Service Commission records concerning
applicants for positions.
See pp. 718-20 and accompanying notes infra. This list was compiled by the Truman
administration in 1948 and articulated in the form of a memorandum which is now
located in the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. It is reprinted
from Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10
FED. B.J. 107, 147-49 (1949).
46. 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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could be subpoenaed. 47 However, Chief Justice Marshall, as the author
of the majority opinion, indicated that a pragmatic enforcement dilemma
would result if, after the delivery of a subpoena upon the President, the
Chief Executive refused to obey its mandate. Thus, the Court qualified
its denial of presidential immunity from judicial process by stating that
there may be justifiable grounds for the President to ignore a court
order.48
The problem and its constitutional ramifications were precisely articu-
lated by Attorney General Stanberry in Mississippi v. Johnson4" as he
defended President Johnson in a suit brought by the state of Mississippi
to enjoin the President from administering the Reconstruction Acts on
the ground that the laws were unconstitutional. The Attorney General
questioned the court's power to incarcerate the President for contempt
if he disobeyed the injunction and he pointed out that even if the courts
were able to have the President arrested, who would perform the Chief
Executive's function while he was in jail. 50 These considerations explain
the different judicial treatment accorded the President as compared to
that given subordinate executive officers: special deference to the Presi-
dency is, if for no other reason than its unitary character, a constitutional
necessity, whereas the subordinate executive officers' functions may al-
ways be performed by someone else. 5'
The Court in Johnson, in concluding that the President could not be
enjoined in this situation determined that the only time an official of the
executive branch is in his official capacity subject to the power of a court
order is when the subject matter of that order is a ministerial duty, involv-
ing no discretionary interpretation on the official's part. The Court found
47. Id. at 34. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688-89 n.26 (1972). For
a recent denial of a presidential claim to immunity from the judicial process, see
Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
48. 25 F. Cas. at 34.
49. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
50. Id. at 488-89.
51. In contrast to the Court's cautious attitude toward the enforcement of judi-
cial process on the President in Burr, subordinate executive officials have uniformly
been found to be subject to judicial order. For example, in Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), a district court issued a writ of mandamus
to the Postmaster General ordering him to pay certain persons sums of money owed
to them by the government pursuant to several contracts. In upholding the writ
the Supreme Court said:
[T]he authority to issue the writ of mandamus to an officer of the United
States, commanding him to perform a specific act required by a law of
the United States, is within the scope of the judicial powers of the United
States, under the constitution.
Id. at 618. See also United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854).
702 [Vol. 23
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that the executive function in executing the laws is not the equivalent
of a ministerial duty.52 Despite the opinion's corollary implication, it did
not explicitly state that a subpoena or any court order could be enforced
to either compel or check the executive performance of a ministerial task.
This concept though has been accepted, as the recent case of Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci53 illustrates.
In Carlucci a federal district court issued an order directing President
Nixon to appoint the members of the National Advisory Council on In-
dian Education which he was authorized to do54 and which at the time
of the suit he had failed to do. 55 In the course of the opinion the court
stated that the President is not completely immune from the judicial proc-
ess, but that there are several situations which would prompt a court to
refuse to issue a court order to the President. First, courts will refrain
when the plaintiff lacks standing, that is, when the plaintiff does not have
a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Secondly, the executive
function which is the subject of the judicial scrutiny must not be of a
discretionary nature, which of course excludes review of the President's
role as Commander-in-Chief 56 and the President's role in the execution
of the laws-in short, any determination which is constitutionally com-
mitted to the sole discretion of the executive branch is immune from judi-
cial scrutiny.57
The derivative conclusions from this analysis should be prefaced by
simply recognizing that Congress, just as the judiciary, has the authority
to subpoena information from the President. However, whether Congress
has the power to enforce that authority depends upon the answer to the
core question in issue: Does an unlimited executive privilege exist, leg-
52. 71 U.S. at 498-99.
53. 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1973).
54. Section 442(a) of the Indian Education Act states: "appointments shall be
made by the President...." Thus, the court, using this language found a duty
devolving upon the President to make the appointments, but it was clearly within
his discretion to determine whom to appoint. 358 F. Supp. at 975.
55. Subsequent to the court order against the President, the district court issued
an order on May 8, 1973, dismissing its previous order as moot because the Presi-
dent had by that time filled the vacancies.
56. If the President is acting within the confines of article II, section two of
the Constitution there can be no judicial review of his action since the Constitu-
tion appoints him alone Commander-in-Chief. However, the type and extent of ex-
ecutive action which is justified by the Commander-in-Chief power is a justiciable
question. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1970); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
57. 358 F. Supp. at 975.
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ally? If the answer to this question is "Yes," then the determination
of whether to assent to a congressional demand for information is totally
within the President's discretion, and any decision he reaches is tradition-
ally not subject to challenge. But, if the answer is "No," then the Presi-
dent has no choice but to deliver the requested information to Congress,
since Congress, by reason of its broad investigatory authority and its con-
comitant subpoena power, has the right to compel such a delivery. De-
spite this dissectional description, the situation is in reality not subject
to such a neat distillation, since a third possibility exists. Even if the
answer to the threshold question is "No," the President, regardless of his
lack of authority, does have the power by his mere possession of the infor-
mation, to unlawfully resist the request. In this situation, because it is
unrealistic to even contemplate the use of physical force to enforce a sub-
poena, the only recourse is the impeachment process with the legislature
as the judge, or the ballot box with the people as the final arbiters of
the dispute.
The answers to these perplexing quaeres can only be formulated after
the legal status of executive privilege is determined. However, this deter-
mination is not easily made, since nowhere is affirmative, unambiguous
authority to be found which establishes an executive exemption from the
ambit of the congressional subpoena power. Nevertheless, executive
privilege advocates have asserted that the doctrine's source is not mythol-
ogy, as has been suggested, 58 but rather it is unequivocally established
by the firmest of legal authorities-legislative acts, judicial decisions and
constitutional mandates as buttressed by American political history.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The proponents of the privilege have frequently argued that its founda-
tion was built by the Congress itself through both official statements
which recognized the prerogative of the President59 and statutory enact-
58. As Mr. George Meader, member of the House of Representatives from
Michigan said in 1958:
Mr. Speaker it is difficult to prove that a non-existent thing does not
exist. That is the dilemma with the so-called Executive privilege. The
burden of proof should be upon those who assert that there is Executive
privilege which, of course, is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution or
in any court decision in any controversy concerning the investigative power
of Congress.
104 CONG. REc. 3853 (1958) (remarks of Representative Meader).
59. It has been urged that the statements of Congressmen in their official capa-
city have the force of establishing an all-pervasive doctrine of unchallengeable dis-
cretion in the executive to determine if Congress should or should not receive re-
quested information. For example, Senator Stennis, in commenting upon President
Kennedy's refusal to submit to the Congress the names of the Defense Department
speech reviewers, said:
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ments which codified its existence. Although no statute specifically states
that there is such a theory, its advocates have found support for their
opinions in laws which focus on a specific problem and, in the course
of that statutory treatment, allow some choice of informational disclosure
to be exercised by the executive branch. The laws relied upon for these
opinions have difffered depending upon ,the time authored; 60 however,
several statutes have been discussed more frequently, and it is these which
provide the most difficult challenge to the executive privilege critic.
The first statute is the Freedom of Information Act6' which, despite
its initial mandate that "[e]ach agency shall make available to the public
information, ' 62 contains a section detailing certain exemptions to the
general disclosure provision among which is information "required by
Executive order to by kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy."'6 3  Although it is debatable whether the President
qualifies as an "agency" within the meaning of the Act and is
subject to its authority, that is beside the point, for it can be argued
that apart from its role in the statutory scheme the exemption is a con-
gressional admission that the privilege exists and as such is established
by this official acknowledgement. The weakness in this position is three-
fold. First, the statute specifically states that this section "is not authority
to withhold information from Congress; '64 in fact, the entire focus of the
Act is on public disclosure. Second, there is a difference between recog-
nition of the privilege and its establishment. Since the recognition of
anything is premised on its establishment, it is indeed circular to attempt
to refute a skeptical analysis of the basis of a legal theory by pointing
I know of no case where the Court has ever made the Senate or the House
surrender records from its files, or where the Executive has made the Leg-
islative Branch surrender records from its files--and I do not think either
one of them could. So the rule works three ways. Each is supreme within
its field.
Hearings Before the Special Preparedness Subcomm. on Military Cold War Educa-
tion and Speech Review Policies of the Senate Comm. on Armed Forces, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 512 (1962). This argument is extremely weak since an
individual legislator's opinions, both official and unofficial, are of no use as legally
binding precedential authority. Cf. p. 751 infra.
60. For example, in an exhaustive study of executive privilege from 1953
through 1960, the authors relied on § 131 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954
for part of their analysis. However, that section has since been repealed. Mutual
Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, § 131(a), 68 Stat. 838. See Kramer and Marcuse,
Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 623
(1961) and 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 827 (1961).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
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to the institutional recognition of that theory as an answer. In addition,
it is somewhat curious to use as blanket justification for the right to with-
hold any and all information from Congress a statute authored and ap-
proved by Congressmen with the express purpose of providing information
to the public.
The lack of an interrelationship between the Freedom of Information
Act and executive privilege was indicated in the case of Soucie v. David.6 5
A group of citizens brought suit under the Act to compel the Director
of the Office of Science and Technology to release certain documents
concerning the development of the supersonic transport aircraft. Al-
though the Director's claim of executive privilege was not properly
raised, Chief Judge Bazelon, in the majority opinion, did comment on
the roots of the privilege which he felt to be in the constitutioal theory
of separation of powers rather than in the statutory exemptions of the
Act.6 6
The second statute that is frequently cited in support of the privilege
is the Departmental Regulations Statute which provides that:
The head of an Executive department or military department may pre-
scribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the cus-
tody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This sec-
tion does not authorize withholding information from the public or limit-
ing the availability of records to the public.67
Several cases interpreting this provision have been advanced as corrobora-
tive evidence of the existence of the executive's informational perogative.
The first case is Boske v. Comingore68 in which the state of Kentucky
brought suit against the owners of a liquor distillery for tax evasion. Dur-
ing the proceedings Comingore, an Internal Revenue agent, was asked
as a deponent to file with the court certain reports in his possession con-
cerning the business activities of the defendants. This he refused to do
based of a department regulation, issued pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301,
which prohibited him as an agent from releasing Internal Revenue records
to anyone without the express permission of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. After being found guilty of contempt of court and imprisoned, the
agent filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court,
in finding for the agent, held that it was neither inconsistent with the
65. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. 448 F.2d at 1071 n.9.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 22 (emphasis added).
68. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
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Constitution nor with the laws of the United States for a department head
to prohibit his subordinates from releasing agency records. 69
In the later case of Touhy v. Ragen,70 the Supreme Court decided
the same issue as presented by facts analogous to those in Boske. A
subordinate official in the Justice Department refused to obey a court
issued subpoena ordering the production of departmental papers under
his control. The Court upheld his refusal, since, as in Boske, it was based
on a department regulation promulgated under the authority of 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 which the Court felt to be a valid regulation. 71
The privilege defenders have read these cases as holding that the exec-
utive has absolute discretion in determining whether and to what extent
information should be released to Congress. Support for this position is
derived from a combination of "wishful" reading and an expansive use
of dicta, for the only issue decided in both opinions was that regulations
issued by a department head pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301 prohibiting em-
ployees from releasing certain types of information were valid because
the statute on which they were basesd was valid. This analysis is sup-
ported by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the Touchy case,
because:
[]o hold now that the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his sub-
ordinates, though within a court's jurisdiction, to produce documents and to
hold later that the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be pro-
cedurally reached would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice that
ought to make Bentham's skeleton rattle.72
The privilege issue and its relationship to 5 U.S.C. § 301 was finally
raised in United States v. Reynolds.73 In Reynolds three widows brought
suit under the Torts Claims Act against the United States when their hus-
bands were killed as the result of an Air Force plan crash. The plaintiffs
moved for the production of the official accident report made by the Air
Force but this motion was met by the Government's claim that Air Force
regulations, issued according to 5 U.S.C. § 301, authorized it to decide
what documents are discoverable and in this case they had simply rejected
the plaintiff's request. The Court accepted this contention, as it deter-
mined that the privilege does exist. However, Chief Justice Vinson's ma-
jority opinion modified the Government's position and in the process neg-
ated the strength of executive privilege when it placed some stringent
69. Id. at 468-69.
70. 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
71. Id. at 468-69.
72. Id. at 473.
73. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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limitations on its assertion. There first must be a formal claim to the
privilege by the head of the department after he has personally evaluated
the information requested, and it is then the court's responsibility to deter-
mine whether the information subject to the claim is in fact privileged. 74
The method by which courts are to make this determination is a balancing
test where
[iln each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine
how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate. When there is a strong showing of
necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the
most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.75
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 11. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Supreme Court, in
explaining the nature of the protection afforded by the statutory disclosure exemp-
tions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1) and (b)(5)
(1970), recognized the existence of an executive privilege for the executive consul-
tive function and for information that is to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy.
The protection given the consultive function is limited to information reflecting
executive policy deliberations and recommendations, and it does not extend to the
factual data upon which those deliberations are based. 410 U.S. at 89. Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Mc-
Fadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966). The Court then proceeded
to review the method used in past cases to determine whether requested information
in the government's possession was discoverable.
In each case, the question was whether production of the contested docu-
ment would be injurious to the consultive functions of government that the
privilege of nondisclosure protects . . .. [Iun applying the privilege,
courts often were required to examine the disputed documents in camera,
in order to determine which should be turned over or withheld.
410 U.S. at 87-88. See also Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 340 (D.D.C.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
The executive privilege pertaining to national defense and foreign policy informa-
tion was also the subject of the Court's discussion, and while the Court emphatically
stated that there would be no in camera inspection allowed when this type of in-
formation is in issue, this remark was addressed to the statutory exemption of the
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970), and not to the executive privilege question. In
fact, the opinion, citing United States v. Reynolds, separated executive privilege
from the statutory exemption when it stated that
Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt
new procedures or it could have established its own procedures (for deter-
mining disclosure)-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive
Privilege may be held to impose upon Congressional ordering. Cf. United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
410 U.S. at 83.
Thus, the Court implied that the standard articulated in Reynolds controls an ex-
ecutive privilege claim for national defense and foreign policy secrets, and as the
quotation in the text discloses it is not the executive who determines what is or
The message from the Reynolds case is clear: While there is certain
information which the Government has a right to conceal, there is no
absolute right in the executive to determine what information enjoys that
status. In essence this is the focus of the executive privilege debate-'
who makes the decision as to what is privileged? Thus, as this analysis
demonstrates, far from establishing the presidential prerogative 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 and its judicial interpretations have either not addressed themselves
to the issue or their combined effect has been to dilute its authority to
the extent that it no longer can be termed executive privilege. The stat-
ute is a "housekeeping" statute which allows a department head to review
information under his agency's control, which is sought for use in another
proceeding, and determine if that information will be the subject of an
executive privilege claim. 76 The statute is procedural in nature, and as
to executive relationships with other institutions it does not vest any sub-
stantive authority.
None of these cases, however, involved a congressional request for in-
formation; they merely settled a private party's access to its political
agent's files. As was previously discussed, the interest of a private party
in the release of executive information is not of the same magnitude nor
of the same nature as that of Congress. 77  The private party seeks to
vindicate his personal rights in an adversary context, whereas the legisla-
ture is concerned with the beneficial interests of everyone within its juris-
dictional limitations, and it operates by constitutional design in a partner-
ship capacity with the executive to effect this end. Thus, if the executive
does not possess an absolute right to claim executive privilege when it
concerns the rights of private citizens, it is questionable whether this au-
thoruty exists at all in the President's relationship with the Congress. The
privilege proponents would answer this question in the affirmative by
pointing to their front-line of support, the Constitution and the doctrine
of separation of powers. 78
is not privileged. Also, it is to be remembered that these executive privilege claims
were made in judicial proceedings to protect against informational disclosure to indi-
viduals, and both the private citizen's role and the judiciary's institutional role in
policy formulations are far more indirect than the legislature's role. See pp. 728-
30 and accompanying notes infra.
76. NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961), United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1954), United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also
Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as
an Autonomous Screen, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1958).
77. See p. 697 supra.
78. As Attorney General Rogers said in 1958, "the executive privilege is not
related to any statute; the executive privilege is an inherent part of our government,
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The Constitution
There is nothing in the Constitution which explicitly bestows upon the
President or any other part of the executive branch a constitutional right
to withhold information from the national legislature. In fact, the only
reference to a legislative-executive communication exchange requires the
President to "from time to time give to the Congress information of the
state of the Union .... ",79 In addition, the only privileges mentioned
in the text of the Constitution are the legislative privilege, 80 allowing Sen-
ators and Representatives to freely discuss and determine national policy
without fear of legal sanction,81 and the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Thus, by a literal reading of the document the Presi-
dent does not possess the power to refuse a congressional request for
pertinent facts. However, a constitution, 'being a blueprint for a govern-
mental system rather than a collection of confining proscriptions, cannot
be interpreted by singular resort to its literal translation, for necessity de-
mands that its phraseology emit a multi-dimensioned network of implied
powers.8 2  Therefore, the first step in determining if executive privilege
can be viewed as one of the President's implied powers is to examine
the objectives of its authors, the framers' intentions.
Framers' Intent
Because there is nothing in the constitutional debates expressly address-
ing the subject,88 it is necessary to examine the general attitude of the
based upon the separation of powers." Hearings on S. 921 Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
26 (1958).
79. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
81. The broad judicial interpretations of this provision indicate the constitutional
importance attached to legislative policy decisions. See, e.g., United States v. John-
son, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). In fact the purpose of this privilege is the preven-
tion of executive intimidation of the legislative process. Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972). For an indication of the breadth of protection afforded,
see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), in which congressional committee mem-
bers, members of their staff and various consultants and investigators were held to
be immune from a suit based on, their publication of a derogatory report on the
District of Columbia school system. For an in depth study of the privilege, see
Reinstein and Silvergate, Legislative privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HAiv. L. REV. 1113 (1973).
82. See pp. 721-26 and accompanying notes infra.
83. In II M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEa.RAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 503
(1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND], James Madison suggested that the privileges
afforded the new executive should be discussed and determined. However, there
is no evidence in the debates that that discussion ever in fact took place.
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founding fathers toward the increments of executive power, because it
is from these concepts that the existence of an executive privilege may
arguably be indicated.
James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, who together were the principal
theoriticians and drafters of the executive article, s4 favored the creation
of a strong, independent institution to be occupied by one man for the
purpose of insuring his ability to act quickly.8 5  In fact, Wilson, in de-
lineating the necessary attributes of the office, used the words "secresy,
vigour, & Dispatch." 8  He was to be elected by the people so that he
would be a person of widespread esteem who would not become con-
trolled by the legislature.8 7 Realizing the enormous concentration of
power which would have to be invested in the office to effectuate this
description, and that such a great degree of power concentration in one
institution to be controlled by one person would supply that individual
with the ability to destroy the system, the framers provided a short term
of office as a periodic check.8 8  Thus, the people would control the po-
tential for abuse by politically monitoring the President's performance.
The inclusion of the impeachment process also furnished the scheme with
an emergency check.89  As Abraham Baldwin, a Georgia delegate to the
convention explained:
As to a President, it appeared to the Opin. of Convention, that he shd be
a Character respectable by the Nations as well as by the foederal Empire.
To this End that as much Power shd be given him as could be consistently
with guardg against all possibility of his ascending in a Tract of years or
Ages to Despotism and absolute Monarchy:-of which all were cautious
Nor did it appear that any Members in Convention had the least idea of in-
sidiously layg the Founda of a future Monarchy like the European or Asia-
tic Monarchies either antient or modem. But were unanimously guarded
and firm against every Thing of this ultimate Tendency. Accordingly
they meant to give considerable Weight as Supreme Executive, but fixt him
dependent on the States at large, and at all times impeachable.90
As Baldwin's summation indicates, there was a distinct fear on the part
of the constitutional delegates that what they were about to create by
84. III FARRAND at 170. Both Wilson and Morris were delegates from Pennsyl-
vania. III FAMIAND 558.
85. I FARRAND at 65-66 (Wilson), II FARRAND 52 (Morris).
86. I FARRAND at 70 (Form in original).
87. II FARRAND at 29 and 403-404 (Morris), I FARRAND 68 (Wilson).
88. II FARRAND at 55 and 407 (Morris), I FARRAND 71 (Wilson). The reali-
zation of this intent is seen in U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, as amended by, amend.
XXI.
89. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 and 7.
90. Mr. Baldwin's impressions were revealed by the diary of Ezra Stiles. III
FARRAND at 168 and n.4.
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way of the executive article was actually a monarch under a different
title, because as James Madison pointed out:
The chief advantages which have been urged in favor of unity in the
Executive, are the secresy, the dispatch, the vigor and energy which the
government will derive from it, especially in time of war. That there are
great advantages, I shall most readily allow. They have been strongly in-
sisted by all monarchial writers .... 91
Thus, the framers intended to invest in the executive branch of the new
government strong powers, while at the same time, due to their past ex-
perience with a system of centralized, unitary direction, they also at-
tempted to design a system in which abuse of that power could be insti-
tutionally thwarted.
In an effort to determine the compatibility of the concept of executive
privilege with this governmental outline, any impression at this time can
only be inconclusively ambiguous, 'because if its adaptibility is viewed pos-
itively, that is, that the fundamentals of "secrecy, vigour and dispatch"
imply total executive control over information in the President's posses-
sion, -then the legislature's functional performance may be within his dis-
cretionary dominion, whereas if the analysis leads to a negative reaction
the skeptic must contend with the seemingly irreconciliable aims of "sec-
resy, vigour and dispatch." At this point though, it is hardly to be ex-
pected that a question of the magnitude of executive privilege would be
subject to a decisive assessment, for that requires a contextual framework
to which the executive structure can be referred.
In The Federalist, James Madison intimated that the prevailing fund-
amental assumption of the framers and the view upon which this nation
has conducted its governmental affairs for close to two-hundred years is
that man by his nature is avariciously power hungry, since as Madison
91. I FARRAND at 112. Madison's views were shared by his contemporaries but
for different reasons, for example: Edmund Randolph (Virginia) was opposed to
the executive's unitary structure, I FA atAND 66, as was Hugh Williamson (North
Carolina) who was, additionally, fearful of the President's reeligibility after his first
term of office, II FARRAND 101; Benjamin Franklin (Pennsylvania) disapproved of
a salary for the President since he felt that remuneration would attract only power-
hungry types, I FARRAND 81-85; John Dickinson (Delaware) felt the only system
of government in which a strong executive could exist was a monarchy, which he
disfavored, I FARRAND 86, 90-92; George Mason (Virginia) opposed a suggestion
that the duration of the President's term of office should be for good behavior, for
as Madison reported, "He considered an Executive during good behavior as a softer
name only for an Executive for life. And that the next would be an easy step to
hereditary Monarchy," II FARRAND 35; Roger Sherman (Connecticut) viewed the ap-
pointment power of the President as a means to form a strong, loyal military the
result of which would be, he feared, a presidentially-inspired military junta, II FAR-
RAND 405; Even Gouverneur Morris, the sponsor of strength in the executive, ex-
pressed his disdain for monarchy, II FARRAND 35-36.
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reasoned, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." 92
Therefore, in Madison's opinion, the way to counteract this human tend-
ency in government would be to check power with power; create a sys-
tem in which every affirmative capability of one branch could be effec-
tive neutralized by supplying another branch, possessing discordant insti'
tutional responsibilities, with a correlative negative capability.9 3 Using
the nature of man as a theoretical backdrop for the mechanics of the
structure, it is not difficult to arrive at the ultimate purpose of the system:
By counter-balancing the power vested in its constitutional agents, the
collective will of the people, which is what the governmental structure
is designed to serve, will be fulfilled. 94  It is this core concept of checks
and balances that is meant when the phrase "separation of powers" is used.
As Justice Brandeis said in his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United
States:95
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of ar-
bitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments to save the people from autocracy.96
In application to the presidential model the doctrine of separation of
powers has not been refuted by the executive privilege advocates.
Rather it has been used by them as a rationale for the privilege's exist-
ence. They reason that the doctrine of separation of powers mandates
each of the co-ordinate branches of government to operate in its sphere
92. TiE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (H. Lodge ed. 1892) (Madison or Ham-
ilton).
93. In Madison's words:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the sub-
ordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and
arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check
on the other-that the private interest of every individual may be a sen-
tinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less
requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
Id. at 323-24.
94. See Stone v. Miss., 101 U.S. 814 (1880), in which Chief Justice Waite's ma-
jority opinion expressed the same view:
But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the gov-
ernment, no part of which can be granted away. The people in their sov-
ereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the
public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and pri-
vate rights.
id. at 820.
95. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
96. Id. at 293.
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independently of the others.97 This leads to the conclusion that one
,branch cannot, without destroying the separation, be forced to yield to
the informational demands of another branch. This argument ignores the
qualifying phrase, "in its own sphere," and therefore, regards the structure
inherent in the concept of -separation of powers as one of mutual exclusion
rather than its actual connotation of mutal interaction.98 Each branch
is meant to perform its constitutionally appointed function without the
intervention of a co-equal branch. For example, the President is given
no vote when bills are being assessed in the House of Congress, just as
Congress is not a party to the execution of those bills once they have
become law. However, when considering executive privilege, 'this fact
is quite irrelevant: Congress does not request the information for the pur-
pose of interfering in the performance of the executive function; it only
seeks to discharge its own obligations in the most responsible manner
which, as previously discussed, necessitates an assessment of all data rele-
vant to a particular problem. Since the President is charged with execut-
ing the laws, he is bound to accumulate a great amount of information
concerning the relative success or failure of legislative programs. If he
can effectively immunize these facts from congressional study, the checks
and balances of the separation of powers doctrine are abrogated, because
the President will be able to dictate the context within which Congress
will consider a problem. The chief executive could supply the legislature
with only the facts which indicate the failure of particular legislation, thus
suggesting more stringent regulation as a solution, or he could supply only
the information which indicates success and mislead the Congress into
disregarding a pressing problem. Yet, in order for separation of powers
to remain a viable theory, no one branch can control the institutional
power balance, otherwise the system of checks and balances becomes an
illusory concept.
As proof that this interpretation is thoroughly consistent with the in-
tended application of the doctrine by the framers, a poignant thought
of Charles Montesquieu, universally acknowledged as the person respon-
sible for the theory's articulation,99 is offered:
97. See Brief for Petitioner at 1101, Nixon v. Sirica, No. 73-1962 (D.C. Cir.,
filed 1973), as reprinted in, 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
1100, 1101 (No. 37, 1973).
98. Alexander M. Bickel, Professor of Law at Yale 'University and an authority
on constitutional law, in commenting upon the attributes of the separation of powers
theory stated "that the separation of powers is an arrangement that leads to friction
to be sure. . . ." Transcript of The Advocates 32 (taped Sept. 27, 1973). See
Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57, 71 A.2d 327, 3,29 (1950), for a similar
explanation of the effect of separation of powers.
99. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 2 (H. Chase
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But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the exec-
utive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what
manner its laws have been executed. . .. 100
Hence, by an analysis of the prior discussion, it can be inferred that the
reaction of the framers toward the constitutional inclusion of an implied
power of executive privilege would not be favorable. Despite the stated
goal of "secresy" for the Chief Executive, which can be accomplished
without an unlimited executive privilege, the fear of monarchy coupled
with the importance the framers ascribed to the theory of separation of
powers provides authority too persuasively negative to the concept to infer
their assent. Nonetheless, in evaluating the constitutional validity of a
peripheral concept such as executive privilege, the framers' intent may
not be a legitimate inquiry. As Professor Walter Murphy argued, the
framers views are irrelevant. Due to the change in the basic character
of the country-from a relatively small, predominantly agrarian economy
to a large, highly industrialized society-the framers' feelings are irrelevant
to modern constitutional interpretation. It is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to accurately attribute one collective intent to the founding
fathers, since the "intent" can only be determined by considering the
attitudes of each individual responsible for the Constitution's creation,
which includes not only each drafter but each ratifier as well.' 0 ' This
problem is particularly noteworthy, since as Justice Jackson once said,
and C. Ducat ed. 1973); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (H. Lodge ed. 1892)
(Madison). Even the constitutional debates reflect the framers' intent to follow
the principles of Montesquieu regarding the separation of powers. I FARRAND at
71 and II FARRAND at 530.
100. C. MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 (T. Nugent transl. 1949).
Montesquieu's theory on the separation of powers has at times been mistakenly rep-
resented as standing for total separation in the various governmental branches. This
is because his writings have been quoted out of context. For example, he stated;
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in
the same body of magistrates there can be no liberty." Id. at 151. However, as
the quote in the text indicates, he did believe that each department should have
at least some control over the power weilded by the other departments. See C.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-62 (T. Nugent transl. 1949); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 47, at 301-302 (H. Lodge ed. 1892) (Madison). See also F.
FLETCHER, MONTESQUIEU AND ENGLISH POLITICS 1750-1800, at 136-37 (1939).
101. Murphy, The Constitution: Interpretation and Intent, 45 A.B.A.J. 592,
593-95 (1959). See also Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History In
Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502 (1964), [hereinafter cited as
Wofford] which advances another noteworthy argument that is particularly appli-
cable to the executive privilege issue. Wofford contends that when a constitutional
issue is raised, "the problem is not to apply one constitutional principle, but to re-
concile two or more such principles." Thus, the two or more intents that are in-
volved will most often clash allowing for nothing but a speculative determination.
Wofford at 510.
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A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields
no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected
sources or each side of any question. They largely cancel each other. 102
A suggestion as to the correct approach for constitutional interpretation
was made though, by Gouveneur Morris when in a latter of 1814 he
urged that it be analyzed "by comparing the plain import of the words,
with the general tenor and object of the instrument."' 10 3
Words and Structure
Lacking a definitive determination of the legal status of executive privi-
lege, it is appropriate to use Morris' suggestion and turn the focus on
the instrument itself, examining both its words and structure in order to
ascertain its objectives.
The first objective of the Constitution relevant to the privilege issue
is a check and balance system of power distribution through the institu-
tional establishment of the familiar separation of powers theory. The
executive article'0 4 delineates three powers of the President which may
be utilized by him to effect national policy, and all of these executive
rights are countered by correlative congressional authority. The execu-
tive power clause which states that "[t]he executive power shall be vested
in a President,"'1 5 is further explained by the admonishment, "he shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ... 106 This is checked
by the general design of the system; in order for there to be laws to
execute Congress must exercise its legislative power which, again, can
only be effectively done when Congress possesses all of the necessary in-
formation. 10 7 The second presidential power is that given to him as Com-
mander-in-Chief' l which has popularly been viewed as a mandate of
presidential automony in the conduct of foreign affairs.' 0 9 However, the
102. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
103. III FARRAND at 420.
104. U.S. CONST. art. II.
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
108. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
109. As Justice Stewart points out in his concurring opinion in New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971):
In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Execu-
tive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of national
defense and international relations.
Id. at 727.
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text of the Constitution reveals a somewhat contrary scheme, for not only
does it assign to Congress the responsibility for declaring war, 10 but it
also empowers the national legislature to raise and support armies,"' pro-
vide a navy," a2 regulate armed forces,"13 regulate commerce with foreign
nations" 4 and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations. 115
The third presidential power, authorizing his entering into treaties with
foreign countries, is conditionally restricted by the necessity of Senate ap-
proval before any treaty can become effective."16 Thus, as the power
structure evinces, the framers successfully expressed their intent in the
document regarding -the separation of powers.
The second pertinent objective of the Constitution is the establishment
of Congress as the principal formulator of national policy."17 As the prior
discussion indicates the legislative branch is 'empowered with authority
to deal with virtually every phase of national policy. This conclusion
is buttressed by the presence of the carte blanche legislative authority
contained in the necessary and proper clause."18 In addition, only Con-
gress, with its power to override a presidential veto," 9 has the constitu-
tional capability to unilaterally institute policy, since once a policy has
been officially expressed in the form of law, a duty devolves upon the
chief executive, regardless of his personal objections, to faithfully admin-
ister the measure.' 20  Also, essentially every program, goal, and policy
110. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 13.
113. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 states that "he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . ." (emphasis added). That this provision imposes a duty on
the President is indicated not only by the bare words but by judicial interpretations
as well. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the
majority opinion considered this clause and concluded:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.
The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the rec-
ommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.
And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make
laws which the President is to execute.
343 U.S. at 587.
The lower courts have used this interpretation to determine that the executive
branch cannot constitutionally impound funds appropriated by the legislature. See,
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championed by the President is dependent upon money for its successful
realization, and the direct control of all appropriations rests with Con-
gress.121
It has already been established that the separation of powers objective
could be frustrated by the constitutionally sanctioned existence of an exec-
utive privilege, but the role of Congress as the chief innovator of national
policy could also be undermined in view of the discretionary control af-
forded the President by the privilege over the data necessary for effective
legislative determinations. Despite these conclusions, the privilege ad-
vocates have maintained a firm position regarding its constitutional va-
lidity by directing attention to the historical incidents of successful presi-
dential privilege claims 122 in conjunction with the Supreme Court's posi-
tion that when the text of the Constitution does not specifically address
a particular question, constitutional power may be established by usage.
In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,12' the Court stated that
[b]oth officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to
any long-continued action of the Executive Department--on the presump-
tion that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often
repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not
reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in de-
termining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight
shall be given to the usage itself--even when the validity of the practice
is subject to investigation. 12 4
Even if this method is phrased in more positive terms without reference
to a presumption, such as, "constitutional power when the text is doubt-
ful mya be established by usage,' 25 it is still tempered by the constant
of reason.
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better rea-
soning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.' 20
e.g., Community Action Programs Executive Directors Ass'n v. Ash, No. 899-73
(D.N.J. June 29, 1973), discussed in, Stanton, The Presidency and The Purse:
Impoundment 1803-1973, 45 COLO. L. REV. 25, 46 (1973), and Sioux Valley Elec-
tric Ass'n, Inc. v. Butz, 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (D.S.D. Nov. 29, 1973).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
122. Brief for Defendant at 1190, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973), as reprinted in, 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 1174, 1190 (No. 39, 1973).
123. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
124. Id. at 472-73.
125. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940).
126. Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
It is this appeal to reason, combined with judicial reverence for constitu-
tional principles, which has shaped United States constitutional history,
for it has encouraged a more dynamic approach to constitutional adjudica-
tion. It is one which recognizes that in order for the Constitution to
retain its position as the legal nucleas of American society, it must be
a flexible instrument which, instead of stating specific rules, expounds
principles capable of just application to unforseen circumstances. 12 7  It
then promotes this purpose by analyzing constitutional ambiguities in the
following fashion:
[I]n determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new
subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the fram-
ers were unfamiliar. For in setting up an enduring framework of govern-
ment they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all vicis-
situdes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which
the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read
legislative codes which are subject to continuous revision with the chang-
ing course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which were
intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing instrument of
government.' 2 8
Although the purposes of the Constitution never change, the structure
in which they are pursued does.129  Therefore, the first step in the appli-
127. As Justice Cardozo stated:
A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but
principles for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that
standard, and descends into details and particulars it loses its flexibility,
the scope of interpretation contracts, the meaning hardens.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF ThE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83-84 (1921).
128. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). See also McCulloch
v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934). However, even if the dynamic approach is not
followed, and the privilege is deemed established by presidential usage, this does
not mean that Congress has relinquished its authority to legislatively control the
privilege's exercise. Justice Black made this clear in response to the Government's
contention that the President's seizure of the steel mills in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) was constitutional because past Presi-
dents had taken the same action.
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have
taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor dis-
putes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive
constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out
the powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the United
States, or any Department or Officer thereof."
343 U.S. at 588-89.
129. The notion of an organic governmental structure, sensitive to and respond-
ing in accordance with changing times, has been the guiding principle in Supreme
Court decisions. For example, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), the Court confronted a challenge to the Virginia poll tax. In finding
the tax utconstitutional, thus overruling Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937),
Justice Douglas' majority opinion offered this justification:
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cation of this method is to determine if executive privilege is consistent
with modern presidential power.
The Power of the Modern President
Having once examined the pristine form of the enumerated powers of
the President, it is now appropriate to examine the effect of their elab-
orated translation.
In Youngstown Sheet & Co. v. Sawyer, 80 the most definitive judi-
cial interpretation of the contemporary Presidency to date, the President,
despite a lack of congressional authorization, ordered the Secretary of
Commerce to seize many of the country's steel mills for the purpose of
averting a threatened strike. The President based his decision on the
disastrous effects a halt in steel production could have on American in-
volvement in the Korean conflict. To justify his act he argued that as
President he possessed an emergency power to act in the public interest
emanating from the aggregate of his enumerated powers.' 8 ' In rejecting
,this contention, the Court held that the Chief Executive's power to issue
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have
never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time
deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights .... Notions of what con-
stitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change.
383 U.S. at 669.
Probably the most famous example of this was displayed in Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Supreme Court overruled the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In so doing, Chief
Justice Warren stated:
In approaching this problem we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools de-
prives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
347 U.S. at 492-93. There are also other constitutional provisions which have dem-
onstrated this evolutionary development. Compare Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 164 (1812), with Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548
(1914), and Wabash R.R. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88 (1897) to observe the develop-
ment of the contract clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. A more recent ex-
ample is the genesis of the numerical composition of a jury as guaranteed by U.S.
CONST., amends. VI and VII. Compare Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898),
with Williams v. Fla., 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and Wilson v. Nooter Corp., 475 F.2d
497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3198 (Oct. 9, 1973), and Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973).
130. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
131. Id. at 587.
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such an order must come either from a congressional act or the Constitu-
tion. Since it did not stem from an act of Congress, the Court turned
its attention to the Constitution and again found no authorization 'either
express or implied.
It is necessary to briefly survey the important cases prior to Youngs-
town which focused on the nature of presidential power before the actual
impact of the decision can be appreciated.
In In re Neagle,132 a United States marshal assigned to protect Su-
preme Court Justice Field was arrested for murder when he frustrated
an attempt on the life of Justice Field by killing the would-be assassin.
The Supreme Court determined that he was entitled to habeas corpus
despite the absence of a statute expressly assigning United States marshals
to Supreme Court Justices as bodyguards.'13  The Court found that
Neagle, as an executive official, was acting pursuant to a delegation of
the general obligation of the President to see that the laws are faithfully
executed. Therefore, no statutory authorization was necessary for the
power's exercise. It is significant, however, that in addition to its reliance
on the executive power clause the Court supported its decision by refer-
ence to an act of Congress which expressed the duties of a marshal in
very general terms.' 34
In 1895, the Court focused on the propriety of an injunction issued
by a lower federal court ordering the American Railway Union to stop
its intereference with railroads using Pullman cars. In rejecting the con-
tention that the court lacked jurisdiction because no statute expressly
authorized courts to enjoin conduct interfering with interstate commerce,
Justice Brewer's opinion in In re Debs'3 5 found, as an attribute of sover-
eignty, power in the federal government to regulate interstate commerce.
This power extended to the executive branch in the form of an inherent
authority to remove all obstacles in the path of commerce, and it also
extended to the judiciary in the form of an inherent power to adjudicate
disputes involving such regulatory attempts. 3 6  Again, though, affirma-
132. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
133. Because Neagle was being detained by California authorities for a crime
committed against that state, he had to show that his act was done pursuant to
a law of the United States in order to qualify for habeas corpus. Act of Mar.
2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634, quoted in 135 U.S. at 58. This ground is still
available today for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1970).
134. 135 U.S. at 68.
135. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
136. Id. at 599.
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tive congressional reaction to related problems of interstate commerce fig-
ured significantly in the Court's rationale.' 37
While both the Neagle and Debs opinions subtly indicate an inherent
power in the President to act in the best interests of the American people,
both cases fortified these indications by reference to statutes which dis-
played policies consistent with the President's utilization of the power.
However, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co.13 no such congressional
inducement was present when the President through an executive order
withdrew public lands from private acquisition. In fact, the President's
action, taken for the purpose of conserving the petroleum resources pres-
ent in the withdrawn land, was contrary to the act of Congress which
declared the land in question accessible to private investment. The
Court, in upholding the President's order, expressly rejected the conten-
tion that "the Executive can be his own action create a power. '13 9  In-
stead, the Court construed congressional acquiescence in previous land
withdrawals as congressional authorization by implication for an executive
withdrawal power. 140
Finally, in Meyers v. United States141 the Supreme Court overturned
an act of Congress which conditioned the President's dismissal of certain
classes of postmasters on Senate consent. Chief Justice Taft, writing for
the majority, viewed the opening phrase of article II, "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in a President," as a grant of power rather than
a mere expression of the Chief Executive's title. He felt that the
authority to remove executive officials rested solely in the province of
the President. While this decision may arguably be asserted to support
the stewardship theory of executive power, 142 nonetheless close scrutiny
137. id. at 579-81.
138. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
139. Id. at 474.
140. Id.
141. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
142. The President credited with formulation of this theory is Theodore Roose-
velt who stated in his autobiography:
My view was that every executive officer in high position, was a steward
of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the
people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his
talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what
was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the Presi-
dent unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief
was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the
needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the
Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive power
I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the Presi-
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discloses Chief Justice Taft's reticence to expand on his initial determina-
tion regarding the opening phrase of article II. Instead, the opinion's
primary discussion revolved around the President's authority to select the
people who would fill positions in the executive branch.143  The decision
did nothing more than to affirm that as a practical necessity in constitu-
tional construction each branch possesses those implied powers necessary
to effect its enumerated powers.
These four cases taken together reveal that the President has no in-
herent power to institute domestic policy, since even in the Debs opinion,
which explicitly referred to inherent executive power, legislative expres-
sion consistent with the President's action grounded the judicial approval.
However, the Chief Executive does possess, in addition to his enumerated
powers, implied authority to fulfill those express delegations, including
the prerogative to reassign their implementation to lower officials and to
choose who will share in such a reassignment. He does not, though, have
the authority to ignore valid congressional policy.
In the area of foreign affairs, the President's power at the time of
Youngstown, while broader than that in the domestic field, was not un-
limited. In the Prize Cases 44 the constitutional validity of President Lin-
coln's blockade of certain Southern ports without the prior approval of
Congress was in issue. Ruling that the President's action was constitu-,
tional, the Supreme Court used the Chief Executive's power as Comman-
der-in-Chief and his obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed
to support its decision. However, since the circumstances which prompted
the blockade, namely a surprise civil rebellion, necessitated a quick and
dent and the heads of the Departments. I did not usurp power, but I did
greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for
the public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all our people,
whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by di-
rect constitutional or legislative prohibition. I did not care a rap for the
mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could
be made of the substance.
T. RooSEWELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHIY 388-89 (1913). This theory has found its primary
opposition in the view espoused by William Howard Taft which he described as
follows:
The true view of the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the Pres-
ident can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced
to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such
express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.
W. TAFr, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 139-40 (1916).
143. 272 U.S. at 161-64. But see Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935).
144. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
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decisive response, the Court recognized that Congress was unable to react
with the requisite speed and thus the responsibility had to fall on the
President.145 In addition, the Court diluted the strength of the opinion
by pointing to the subsequent ratification of the blockade by the legisla-
tive branch as support. 146
Then in 1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,147 the
Court was confronted with a challenge to a statute allowing the President
to forbid the sale of arms to South American countries engaged in the
Chaco conflict if in his discretion such action might contribute to a peace-
ful settlement. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion rejected the claim
that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
and found that the President is "the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations . . . " 1,48 and that the power af-
forded him by virtue of this status is not dependent upon congressional
action for its exercise. However, two considerations concerning this
broad holding should punctuate its acceptance. First, the inherent power
determination was dictum, since Congress had conferred upon the Presi-
dent's action its statutory blessing. Second, even though the inherent
power theory is authenticated as a result of this case, its theoretical po-
tency is questionable since the Court determined that its application must
be in subordination to the relevant provisions of the Constitution which
could include mandatory presidential deference to the legislative will
when expressed.149
Thus, at the time of the Youngstown decision the President had in the
field of foreign relations broad inherent power to initiate and develop
national policy without congressional assistance. This authority was lim-
ited, though, by concurrent jurisdiction constitutionally vested in Congress
which, as Curtiss-Wright hinted, might predominate when exercised.
Returning now to the effect of the President's unconstitutional seizure
of the steel mills,' 50 it should be remembered that the reason for the
Court's finding was the absence of a statutory or constitutional grant of
power which would sustain the President's act. The opinion rejected both
the President's role as Commander-in-Chief and the executive power
clause as proper authority for the deprivation of private property in order
145. Id. at 669. See also United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623,
627 (1870).
146. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670-71.
147. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
148. Id. at 320.
149. Id.
150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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to maintain economic productivity and, in the process, impliedly rejected
the proffered aggregate of powers theory.' 5 ' This opinion, while disposi-
tive of the issue, did not represent the consensual posture of the Court
since it was accompanied by five concurrences and one dissent. The spe-
cifics of each Justice's view are not significant, but what is important is
the fundamental agreement reached by all of the opinions, including
Chief Justice Vinson's dissent, regarding the basic relationship between
presidential and congressional power. They concluded that while the
President may possess power 'beyond the enumerated authority of article
II, nonetheless, Congress may amend, limit, or provide for the method
of its exercise if the subject is one which Congress can constitutionally
regulate. 152 But, when the national legislature has not manifested its will,
the nature and amount of inherent executive power which can be exerted
will depend upon the nature and gravity of the situation. 53  As Justice
Jackson stated in his concurrence:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential respon-
151. The Court's opinion did not specifically address the aggregate of powers
contention. However, it did examine each alleged component of the aggregate indi-
vidually and in each case it found no support for the President's action. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, first considered the President's role as Commander-
in-chief and found the requisite "theater of war" to be absent. Next, he examined
the provisions which bestow upon the President the executive power, namely article
II, sections one and three, and concluded that the determination of when it is ap-
propriate for the government to seize private property is a decision to be made by
the nation's lawmakers and the Constitution clearly delegates that role to the Con-
gress.
152. This is true even when applied to the area of international relations in
which presidential initiative has been accorded the widest latitude. New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Thus a treaty negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate may be abro-
gated by an act of Congress. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 & n.34 (1957); Fung
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 600-601 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888);
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
153. These conclusions have been borne out by recent cases. For example, in
Local 2677, American Fed. of Gov. Emp. v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.
1973), the Acting Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, an arm of the
executive branch, attempted to dismantle OEO before the program's congressional
authorization had expired. The District Court for the District of Columbia citing
Youngstown as its authority, held that the executive branch must continue to operate
an authorized program until the funds expire or until Congress declares otherwise.
See, e.g., Penn v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973); Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
sibility. In this area any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on ab-
stract theories of law.' 54
Considering the issue of executive privilege in light of these principles,
it is evident that its existence is inconsistent with the prevalent view of
constitutional power distribution between the executive and legislative
branches. First, there is, as previously discussed, no provision of the
Constitution that grants an executive privilege. 155  Second, executive
privilege is not a power which can be viewed as an implied method of
instituting one of the Chief Executive's enumerated powers.1 56 Third,
while a congressional request for information may seek the disclosure of
data relating to an emergency, there is nothing in the request itself which
would require of the President the urgent and decisive action necessary
to justify uncooperative refusals on the basis of an inherent power theory.
In addition, the inherent power theory is only applicable to situations in
which the Congress has not acted or is not empowered to act. Neither
of these circumstances is presented by the privilege issue since by its
request for information Congress has acted, and due to the broad scope
of its legislative and investigative power it has the authority to act.
Beside the lack of a power base from which to seriously assert its exist-
ence, there is another more practical consideration which militates
against the constitutionality of executive privilege: the ability of the
President to dominate the media threatens to upset the delicate power
balance of the check and balance system of power distribution.
Recent statistics, disclosing that 97 percent of all Americans possess
at least one television set which on the average operates about seven
hours every day,'5 7 and that most people rely on television as their pri-
mary source of news,' 58 demonstrate how media-oriented American so-
ciety has become. In modern times the President has been able to har-
ness television's evident potential and turn it into a devestating political
weapon. For example, support for President Nixon's position on South-
east Asia rose 18 percent after one televised address to the nation. 15
154. 343 U.S. at 637.
155. See p. 710 and accompanying notes supra.
156. See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161-64 (1926).
157. N. MINOW, J. MARTIN AND L. MITCHELL, PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION 5
(1973) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION], citing B. BIGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION
MACHINES 183 (1971), and BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1972, at 36.
158. TELEVISION at 5-6, citing, BROADCASTING, April 5, 1971, at 24, and BROAD-
CASTING, April 10, 1972, at 88.
159. TELEVISION at 19, citing, Hearings on S. 1. Res. 209 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
91-74, at 19 (1970).
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This dynamic potential coupled with the realizations that the President's
access to the air waves is a virtual monoply when compared to the televi-
sion opportunities available to Congress16 and that the President's re-
liance on this communication vehicle is increasing, 161 reveals the enor-
mous amount of raw political strength which the President possesses in
addition to his constitutional endowments. The question then, is this:
should executive privilege be added to the President's political arsenal?
The constitutional response is no, for if it is included then the President
is not only capable of manipulating the public reaction to national pol-
icy, 16 2 but he may additionally control the indispensible ingredient for
wise policy determinations-the facts.
160. It is easy for a President to command television time; after all, the execu-
tive branch through the FCC controls all television licenses, and the members of
the FCC are appointed by the President. TELEVISION at 150. In addition, a half-
hour program during prime time costs an individual about $250,000, but for the
President the use of the air waves is free. However, there is no congressional right
to free time, and even if an individual Congressman's request for a television ap-
pearance is granted, he is just one of five hundred thirty-five voices which, of
course, diminishes the effect of his message proportionately. TELEVISION at 105,
citing, interview of Senator Charles Mathias (R. Md.), interviewed on Thirty Min-
utes, Nov. 30, 1972. In fact, sometimes a Congressman's request is turned down
because in the broadcasters' opinion his message is not newsworthy. Consider the
case of Senator McGovern when he requested time as a presidential candidate to
explain to the nation the resignation of Senator Eagleton as his running-mate. The
networks refused because in their view Senator McGovern's appearance would not
be important unless he were to name Senator Eagleton's successor. TELEVISION at
22.
Justice Jackson made this point in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), when he stated:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in
whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public
hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions
so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and
ear. No other personality in public life can begin to compete with him
in access to the public mind through modern methods of communications.
By his prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he
exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his
power which often cancels their effectiveness.
343 U.S. at 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).
161. In three and one-half years, President Nixon made thirty-one prime-time
appearances, compared with twenty-four for President Johnson in five years, ten for
President Kennedy in three years and twenty-three by President Eisenhower in eight
years. TELEVISION at 56, citing, Address by Richard Salant, President of CBS News
to the Journalism Foundation of Metropolitan St. Louis, May 1, 1972.
162. As Minow, Martin and Mitchell explain:
Congressmen supporting a move to override a presidential veto of legis-
lation-a veto message delivered by a president before millions of televi-
sion viewers-are not likely to be able to command free, prime, simul-
taneous three-network broadcast time for their side of the issue to quell
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Thus, no provision, theory, or method of construction supports the con-
stitutional existence of an absolute right in the President to withhold infor-
mation from Congress. There remains, however, one more supporting
argument and it is by far the most plausible.
The Need For Secrecy
Privilege advocates have asserted that as a matter of policy the Chief
Executive needs to keep his presidential communications secret. In fact,
they adamantly insist that the effective operation of the executive office
is dependent upon the existence of a presidential shield. In support of
their position they have offered two reasons.
First, wise executive policy formulations are contingent upon the ex-
ploration of all available options. If there is a possibility that the opin-
ions of the President and his advisors on policy matters may be subject
to congressional scrutiny they will be reluctant to discuss and consider
every view. The Supreme Court has recognized this problem and has
in some cases sanctioned secrecy as a solution. For example, in EPA
v. Mink'16 3 the Court rejected a challenge to the exemption of certain
documents from the disclosure section of the Freedom of Information Act.
Although a statutory privilege 'enacted for the purpose of protecting
against unwarranted disclosure in judicial proceedings rather than execu-
tive privilege vis-a-vis Congress was in issue, the Court made the general
statement that
[tlhere is a public policy involved in this claim of privilege . . . the
policy of open frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning
administrative action.' 64
In addition to this, both the national legislature and judiciary enjoy a
similar privilege for this same reason. The congressional shield is the
result of an explicit constitutional grant 65 so it is of little use as analogy.
the flow of constituent mail generated by the president's [sic] appear-
ance . ..
TELEVISION at 13.
163. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
164. Id. at 87, quoting from Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. United
States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Accord, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-25 (D.D.C. 1966).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, provides:
Each House shall keep a journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their Judgment re-
quire Secrecy. ...
However, the principal constitutional provision which bestows this privilege upon
Congress is the speech and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. See discus-
sion in note 81, supra.
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But the general acceptance of the Court's privilege, in view of its apparent
lack of legal justification, provides support for the executive since as
Chief Justice Burger has pointed out:
No statute gives this Court express power to establish and enforce the ut-
most security measures for the secrecy of our deliberations and records.
Yet I have little doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect
The confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial measures
may be required. 166
Accordingly, in order to avoid a chilling effect on discussion within the
executive branch, an executive privilege should extend. 16 7
There are, however, two problems with this analysis. First, it would
seem that any person who is reluctant to have his views subjected to
the scrutiny of Congress perhaps has not sufficiently considered and sub-
stantiated his view to justify any audience whatsoever, much less with
the President who might make a major policy decision based on those
views. Second, using the judiciary's privilege to justify one for the execu-
tive ignores the functional difference between those two institutions. The
judiciary is the only branch assigned by the Constitution to resolve dis-
putes between parties, whereas the President, in sharing the responsibility
for national policy with the concurrent authority of Congress, does not
have complete dominion over the decisional process. In the few areas
where Congress does not possess such authority, 168 the President, like the
judiciary, can secret information, since as previously pointed out Congress'
investigatory powers only comprehend materials in which it has a valid
legislative interest.' 69
The second reason offered by the supporters of the executive confiden-
tiality is the need for security. The merit in this contention was recog-
nized by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in New York Times
Co. v. United States.' 70
166. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting). See also Statement of the Judges, 14 F.R.D. 335 (N.D. Cal.
1953).
167. In addition to the privilege accorded the officials in the government, the
private citizen also has certain rights to secrecy for the purpose of promoting can-
did communication in the form of evidentiary privileges. The attorney-client privi-
lege, marital privilege and physician-patient privilege are some examples of these.
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87 (attorney-client), 86
(marital), and 98 (physician-patient) (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2291 (attorney-client), 2332 (marital),
and 2380(a) (physician-patient) (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
168. One obvious example would be the pardoning power, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1, the exercise of which is totally committed to executive discretion.
169. See pp. 695-97 and accompanying notes supra.
170. 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971).
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Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplo-
macy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both
confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Na-
tion in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their
confidences will be kept. And within our own executive departments, the
development of considered and intelligent international policies would be
impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate
with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic
national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-
evident.171
The settlement reached in Viet Nam and the resumption of relations with
the People's Republic of China, both the result of delicate and confiden-
tial negotiation, indicate the need for some degree of secrecy in the area
of foreign relations. However, despite the impressive merit of these ac-
complishments, the need for secrecy should be accepted cautiously for
the executive practice of conducting foreign affairs without congressional
assistance has also culminated in catastrophe. The information revealed
as a result of the release of the "Pentagon Papers" underscores the enor-
mity of consequences to the nation when a decision is made by a very
limited group of executive officials who reject the demands of the legisla-
ture for full information thus preventing the responsible exercise by Con-
gress of its constitutionally appointed duties of declaring war and main-
taining an army.17 2
Considering all of the competing factors, it is apparent that in order
for the Presidency to remain a functional institution, it must enjoy a cer-
tain degree of secrecy if all executive policy alternatives are to be vigor-
ously explored and if the President, as the country's primary foreign am-
bassador, is to carry on delicate foreign relations in an effective and confi-
dential manner. It is because of this dilemma, that is, the need for both
secrecy and disclosure, that Congress must take decisive legislative steps
to clear up the quagmire that harbors the question of executive privilege.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Several proposals dealing with the privilege are presently pending in
Congress. Senate Bill 858,173 introduced by Senator Fulbright, allows for
171. Id. at 728. As illustrative of the great control the President has over for-
eign policy, consider executive agreements. No provision of the Constitution grants
the power for their creation, yet they have uniformly been found to be within the
President's authority. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 and cl. 12.
173. S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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the members and employees of the executive branch to claim the privilege
only if that claim is accompanied by a signed statement from the Presi-
dent requiring the employee to refuse the congressional request. 174 If
the President takes this action it is for the committee requesting the infor-
mation to determine if the executive position is justified.1 7 5  If the com-
mittee finds that the claim is unwarranted, it is to file a resolution, to-
gether with a report and the portion of the record of its proceedings rele-
vant to the claim, with the House it represents to then determine
the proper action to be taken.17 6 Also there is another section of the
Bill which focuses on executive privilege claims by agencies. 177 The pro-
cedure for resolving these cases is essentially the same as that applied
to executive officials, except that in the President's verifying statement
he must also articulate his reasons for approving the claim, 178 and in the
event a congressional request is totally ignored by an agency for more
than forty days, the General Accounting Office is to deprive the agency
of access to its funds until either a privilege claim is made or the informa-
tion is given to Congress. 1 79
Although the general tenor of Senate Bill 858180 is sound, the specifics
in its approach could still be improved. First, the policy section or pre-
amble should establish that, for the reasons discussed in this article, the
legality of the doctrine of executive privilege is questionable and that
174. Id. § 306(b).
175. Id. § 306(c).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 307.
178. Id. § 307(e)(3).
179. Id. § 307(f) states:
If the General Accounting Office determines that any information re-
quested of an agency by any such committee, subcommittee, or office has
not been made available within a period of thirty days after the request
has been received by that agency, and if during such period the President
has not signed a statement invoking executive privilege with respect to that
information, no funds made available to that agency shall be obligated or
expended commencing on the fortieth day after such request is received
by such agency or employee of that agency, unless and until such informa-
tion is made available or the President invokes executive privilege with re-
spect to such information.
180. There are also two other pieces of legislation pending before the Senate.
These are: S. Con. Res. 30, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and S.J. Res. 72, 93d
Cong., 1st Ses. (1973), both of which mirror the sentiments and procedures speci-
fied in S. 858. However, it should be noted that Senate Concurrent Resolution
30 would add the requirement that when the President seeks to invoke executive
privilege on behalf of an officer or employee of the executive branch, he must set
forth the grounds on which the invocation is based. S. Con. Res. 30, 93d Cong.,
lstSess. § 1 (1973).
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Congress possesses the broadest power to require executive disclosure. In
addition, the preamble should state that, as a general policy, the execu-
tive, to the greatest extent possible, should cooperate with the Congress
by giving it the information it seeks. It should also express a similar
legislative commitment that Congress will not meddle unnecessarily in the
executive function, but will only seek information which legitimately re-
lates to the legislative process The Fulbright Bill fails to make suffi-
ciently clear Congress's broad power; it tends to sanctify a right to execu-
tive privilege without stating clearly and forthrightly Congress' concomi-
tant right to obtain information. 81
Second, the instances in which executive privilege might properly be
invoked should be defined. It is not enough to allow the President to
claim the privilege and then give Congress a procedural mechanism to
overcome the President should it not agree with his claim. Congress or
the judiciary may have to decide whether the privilege is being properly
invoked; they should be provided with a clear standard by which to make
such a determination. Therefore, in recognition of the President's need
for secrecy on policy grounds, 82 the direct communications between the
President and another party should be protected if the matters in discus-
sion legitimately relate to aspects of national policy. Thus, if there were
questions in a committee hearing about illegal activities by members of
the executive branch, or questions about campaign activities not related
to government business, this information would still be accessible to a
congressional demand-even if the information were contained in a
memo to or from the President.
Other communication within the executive branch which, although
legitimately relating to policy matters do not include the President as a
party, should be subject to the protection of the executive's shield if two
requirements are met: (1) the information would be protected from
a judicial demand under certain exemptions of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act;183 and (2) from all the circumstances surrounding the claim
181. The preambles to S. Con. Res. 30 and S.J. Res. 72 seem to adequately meet
this need by stressing the separation of powers, the erosion of checks and balances
and the need of Congress for information in order to legislate effectively.
182. See pp. 728-30 and accompanying notes supra.
183. The exemptions which should be used for this privilege are contained in
section (b) of the Act:
(b) This section [the disclosure section] does not apply to matters that
are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
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of privilege, it appears that the congressional need for the information
is outweighed by the necessity for executive suppression. The second
of these requirements can of course only be satisfied when the President
himself certifies the need for the privilege with reasons why it should
attach. As in Senator Fulbright's Bill, the merit of the President's conten-
tions will be determined by the committee.18 4
Third, procedures for resolving impasses over executive privilege should
be included. Senate Bill 858 authorizes the committee to submit a reso-
lution to the floor of its House of Congress which states that the informa-
tion requested is essential to the conduct of its legislative business.
However, it stops here by simply providing that if the House of Congress
agrees with its committee it shall determine the subsequent action to be
taken.' 85 Some have suggested that Congress use its own remedy, the
contempt power, by sending the Sergeant-at-Arms out to place the indi-
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy ....
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (3), (4) and (6) (1970).
184. Probably the most workable formula by which a committee could make this
determination would be a restricted in camera type of hearing. If after the com-
mittee has reviewed the Chief Executive's reasons for the privilege claim and the
surrounding circumstances of that particular case does not agree with the Presi-
dent's position, it should allow the President to choose from among those serving
on the committee, one person from each party who will partially review the re-
quested information. These two Congressmen will report to the committee their
recommendations for further action. It will then be the responsibility of the entire
committee to determine if these recommendations should be followed. If the Presi-
dent should refuse to assent to the restricted review of the material, the committee
may always, by filing a report, turn the disposition of the matter over to its House.
The in camera inspection procedure has been used by the courts for determining
the nature of material claimed to be privileged under the exemptions of the Freedom
of Information Act. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court indicated
when an in camera inspection is appropriate:
Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will be necessary and ap-
propriate. But it need not be automatic. An agertcy should be given the
opportunity by means of detailed affidavits or oral testimony, to establish
to the satisfaction of the District Court that the documents sought fall
clearly beyond the range of material that would be available to a private
party in litigation with the agency. The burden is of course, on the
agency resisting disclosure. ...
410 U.S. at 93. The congressional committees should follow this approach when
its investigations counter executive privilege claims. See also Ethyl- Corp. v. EPA,
478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Howkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Legal Aid Society of Ala-
meda County v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Welford v. Hardin,
315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970).
185. S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306(c) (1973).
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vidual in custody; then arraign him and try him for contempt. 8 6  As
applied to the President or a high executive official, this is an unneces-
sarily contentious method which would probably fail and in the process
create a strong base of public support for the beleaguered President. But,
in order to maintain the dignity of the legislature and to maximize the
probability of executive compliance with legislative requests, Congress
should enlist the help of the federal courts.
In Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 8 7 the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia dismissed the Senate Committee's attempt to subpoena
certain tape recordings of conversations between the President and his
aides. The basis for the ruling was a lack of jurisdiction.' 8 8  Senator
186. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970).
187. 366 F. Supp. 51 (D. D.C. 1973).
188. Id. Although jurisdiction was the problem in the "Tape Case," critics have
also argued that there is another more compelling reason for finding a congressional
challenge to executive privilege nonjusticiable, and that is the political question doc-
trine. Brief for Defendant at 1177, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp.
51 (D. D.C. 1973), as reprinted in, 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL Doc-
UMENTS 1174, 1177 (No. 39, 1973). In presenting this position the privilege advo-
cates have relied on statements such as the one made by Chief Justice Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (18031):[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents
of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to
act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal dis-
cretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear, than that their acts are only
politically examinable.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
First, as a practical matter the courts should decide this issue since if they do
not it is incumbent upon the two interested branches to resolve their differences
and make the determination. As the Supreme Court recently stated:
The check-and-balance mechanism, buttressed by unfettered debate in an
open society with a free press, has not encouraged abuses of power or tol-
erated them long when they arose. This may be explained in part because
the third branch has intervened with neutral authority.
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972).
Second, it would not be a new development for the courts to determine the limits
of executive power vis-h-vis congressional authority. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Meyers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128(1871). In fact, the judiciary can resolve the issue even if the President is named
as a party to the action. Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. N.Y. 1972);
Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Finally, a case between the President or any member of the executive branch
and the Congress concerning the issue of executive privilege would not present a
political question since it simply does not fall within any of those categories defined
as a political question. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the definition for a political question previously formulated in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). A political question is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
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Kennedy has introduced a bill which would alleviate this problem. 189 It
would allow either House of Congress or any committee thereof to bring
a civil action against a contumacious witness in order to compel the dis-
closure. 190 This suit would be heard in the District Court for the District
of Columbia by a three judge panel who would determine the validity
of an executive privilege claim.' 9 ' If the court found that the need for
such protection was unsubstantiated it would issue an injunction ordering
the witness to yield to the congressional demand. 192
The engagement of this neutral third branch to settle a dispute between
the Congress and the President is the best remedial procedure; a con-
tempt citation from an impartial court certainly would lend credibility to
the congressional position. If, however, the President were to ignore the
judicial order then the ultimate breakdown in a government of laws
would be reached and Congress would have to resort to its own impeach-
ment power for a solution.193
CONCLUSION
As the analysis of statutory authority and constitutional theory and in-
terpretation demonstrates, there is no solid basis for the existence of an
executive privilege. Furthermore, its unsupported assertions have rele-
gated Congress to the role of executive caddy in the legislative process,
the result of which has been inept national policy and a growing cynicism
dinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion,
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-farious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
395 U.S. at 518-19, quoting from, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. Obviously, there
is no clear constitutional commitment of executive privilege to the President. The
statutory proposals provide clear standards by which to determine the issue. Also,
since as a practical matter it is better for the courts to intercede in this dispute rather
than leaving the resolution to the interested branches, there would be no lack of
respect shown to either party if the Court settled the controversy arising over a
privilege claim. Last, when Congress takes a position and the President assumes
a contrary stance, it certainly does not complicate or intensify the issue if the judici-
ary plays referee. In fact, a Court decision lessens the possibility of future confron-
tations.
189. S. 2073, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
190. Id. at § 3101.
191. Id. at § 1364. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970).
192. S. 2073, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3102(b) (1973).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 and cl. 7.
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in the American people toward their government. The Congress, by tac-
itly accepting the President's claim to an inherent right to the privilege,
and the President by increasing the use of executive secrecy, must both
share the blame for this situation. However, it can be remedied; Con-
gress must take the initiative by defining and limiting the instances of
its use, and the President must realize that for every privilege claim made,
a proportionate decrease in executive credibility both with the Congress
and with the people results. There are some considerations which suggest
a need for a certain amount of confidentiality in executive operations,
but there are no extenuations that justify the inclusion of a wholesale
executive privilege in a government where effective policy is dependent
upon the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches.
Thomas E. Evans II*
* The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance rendered by Sam
Borek, George Mahoney and Larry Staat, members of the DePaul Law Review Staff.
736 [Vol. 23
